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From Hume’s discussion of the specie-flow mechanism under the gold standard to 
the Keynes-Ohlin debate on the transfer problem associated with German reparations 
after the First World War, understanding the flow of capital across national borders has 
been central to international economics.  My work on the topic has focused mainly on the 
flow of funds between rich and poor countries.  Theory tells us that, for the recipient, 
foreign capital put to good use can finance investment and stimulate economic growth.  
For the investor, capital flows can increase welfare by enabling a smoother path of 
consumption over time and, through better risk sharing as a result of international 
diversification, a higher level of consumption.    
The reality is that the effects of such flows—both as seen from recent experience 
or the longer sweep of history—do not fit neatly into those theoretical presumptions.  As 
a result, my research has mostly been directed at shedding light on four questions: 
1. What motivates rich-to-poor capital flows? 
2. Why doesn’t capital flow more from rich to poor countries? 
3. What are the consequences of a surge of capital inflows for an emerging 
market economy? 
4. How do policy makers typically respond to an incipient inflow of capital? 
I will devote most of my discussion looking back to history—sometimes quite distant 
history—to shed light on these issues.  If that seems odd on a program asking “What’s 
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next?” it should not.  My reading of experience is that history repeats.  Sometimes, as in 
the case of Argentina in the first half of the last century and the opening years of this one, 
it repeats first as tragedy and then as farce.  But it repeats. 
Indeed, I sometimes think that I could teach a course on the “Principles of 
Emerging Market Finance” entirely from the Old Testament of the Bible.  We would 
learn that: 
1. Officials are fallible; 
2. People do not learn lessons from the past; and, 
3. When the resulting wrath of the Lord is unleashed, it does not always 
discriminate between sinners and the virtuous. 
So, I will talk about what is next—it is mostly what has been. 
The Causes of Capital Inflows 
The surge in capital inflows to emerging market economies in the early part of 
each of the past two decades was initially attributed to domestic developments, such as 
sound policies and stronger economic performance that would imply both the good use of 
such funds in the recipient and the informed judgment of investors in the developed 
world.1  The widespread nature of the phenomenon became clearer over time, however, 
as most developing countries—whether having improved, unchanged, or impaired 
macroeconomic fundamentals—found themselves the destination of capital from global 
financial centers.  The single factor encouraging those flows was the sustained decline in 
interest rates in the industrial world.2  For example, short-term interest rates in the United 
States declined steadily in the early 1990s and by late 1992 were a their lowest level since 
the early 1960s.  This experience was repeated as the federal funds rate touched 1 percent 
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in 2003.  Lower interest rates in developed nations attracted investors to the high yields 
offered by economies in Asia and Latin America.  Given the high external debt burden of 
many of these countries, low world interest rates also appeared to improve their credit-
worthiness and reduce their default risk.  Those improvements were reflected in a marked 
rise in secondary market prices of claims on most of the heavily indebted countries and 
pronounced gains in equity values.  As night follows the day, the tightening of monetary 
policy in the United States and the resulting rise in interest rates made investment in Asia 
and Latin America relatively less attractive, triggering market corrections in several 
emerging stock markets and decline in the prices of emerging market debt. 
This experience strongly suggests multiple forms of investor myopia:  The initial 
decision to invest seemed more motivated by reaching for yield without an appropriate 
appreciation of risk and the sudden withdrawal similarly looked more like a quick dash 
for the exit door than a reasoned assessment of fundamentals.  The common theme is that 
investors enter each episode of upsurge in capital flows confident in the belief that “this 
time it is different” and look too international financial institutions to make them whole 
when they later learn that it really wasn’t different. 
Rich-to-Poor Capital Flows 
To some, the mystery of cross-border flows is not these recurrent cycles 
unanchored from country conditions but the restricted volume of these flows overall.  
Most famously, Robert Lucas argued that it was a puzzle that more capital does not flow 
from rich countries to poor countries, given back-of-the envelope calculations suggesting 
massive differences in physical rates of return in favor of capital poor countries.3  Lucas 
argued that the paucity of capital flows to poor countries must be rooted in fundamental 
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economic forces, such as externalities in human capital formation favoring further 
investment in already capital rich countries.   My perspective, informed by work with 
Kenneth Rogoff and Miguel Savastano, is quite different.4 
Throughout history governments have demonstrated that “serial default” is the 
rule, not the exception.  (The discouraging record is listed in Table 1).  Argentina has 
famously defaulted on five occasions since its birth in the 1820s. However, Argentina’s 
record is surpassed by many countries in the New World (Brazil, Liberia, Mexico, and 
Uruguay, Venezuela and Ecuador) and by almost as many in the Old World (France, 
Germany, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey).  Rogoff, Savastano, and I argue that this history 
of repeated defaults makes some countries less able to bear debt.  These “debt intolerant” 
countries typically have other indicia of governmental failures, including bouts of high 
inflation, variable macroeconomic policies, and a weak rule of law. 
From this perspective, the key explanation to the “paradox” of why so little 
capital flows to poor countries may be quite simple--countries that do not repay their 
debts have a relatively difficult time borrowing from the rest of the world. The fact that 
so many poor countries are in default on their debts, that so little funds are channeled 
through equity, and that overall private lending rises more than proportionally with 
wealth, all strongly support the view that credit markets and political risk are the main 
reasons why we do not see more capital flows to developing countries.5  
What’s next:  If credit market imperfections abate over time due to better 
institutions, human capital externalities or other “new growth” elements may come to 
play a larger role. But as long as the odds of non repayment are as high as 65 percent for 
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some low income countries, credit risk seems like a far more compelling reason for the 
paucity of rich-poor capital flows. 
The Consequences of Capital Inflows 
The experience of many emerging market economies is that attracting global 
investors' attention is a mixed blessing of macroeconomic imbalances and attendant 
financial crises.  As to the imbalances, a substantial portion of the surge in capital inflows 
ends to be channeled into foreign exchange reserves.  For instance, from 1990 to 1994, 
the share devoted to reserve accumulation averaged 59 percent in Asia and 35 percent in 
Latin America.  Moreover, in most countries the capital inflows were associated with 
widening current account deficits.   
This widening in the current account deficit usually involved both an increase in 
national investment and a fall in national saving.  As one would expect from the fall in 
national saving, private consumption spending typically rises.  While disaggregated data 
on consumption are not available for all emerging market economies, the import data are 
consistent with the interpretation that the consumption boom is heaving driven by rising 
imports of durable goods.  (This held with particular force in the Latin American 
experience of the early 1990s.)  In almost all countries, capital inflows were accompanied 
by rapid growth in the money supply—both in real and nominal terms and sharp 
increases in stock and real estate prices.  For example, during 1991, a major equity index 
in Argentina posted a dollar return in excess of 400 percent, while Chile and Mexico 
provided returns of about 100 percent. 
Then comes the crisis because the surge in capital flows never proves durable.  
Unlike their more developed counterparts, emerging market economies routinely lose 
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access to international capital markets. Furthermore, given the common reliance on short-
term debt financing, the public and private sectors in these countries are often asked to 
repay their existing debts on short notice. Even with the recent large-scale rescue 
packages, official financing only makes up for part of this shortfall. Hence, the need for 
abrupt adjustment arises  
More often than not, contagion followed on the heels of the initial shock. The 
capacity for a swift and drastic reversal of capital flows—the so-called “sudden stop” 
problem—played a significant role.6  An analysis of the experience of contagious 
financial crises over two centuries (with my colleagues Graciela Kaminsky and Carlos 
Vègh) found typically that the announcements that set off the chain reactions came as a 
surprise to financial markets.7  The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated 
events appears critical, as forewarning allows investors to adjust their portfolios in 
anticipation of the event.  In all cases where there were significant immediate 
international repercussions, a leveraged common creditor was involved—be it 
commercial banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, or individual bondholders—who helped to 
propagate the contagion across national borders. 
Additional work with Graciela Kaminksy indicated that contagion is more 
regional than global.8 We found that susceptibility to contagion is highly nonlinear. A 
single country falling victim to a crisis is not a particularly good predictor of crisis 
elsewhere, be it in the same region or in another part of the globe.  However, if several 
countries fall prey, then it is a different story. That is, the probability of a domestic crisis 
rises sharply if a core group of countries are already infected.  Is the regional complexion 
of contagion due to trade links, as some studies have suggested, or is it due to financial 
 7
links--particularly through the role played by banks? Our results suggest that it is difficult 
to distinguish among the two, because most countries that are linked in trade are also 
linked in finance. In the Asian crises of 1997, Japanese banks played a similar role in 
propagating disturbances to that played by U.S. banks in the debt crisis of the early 
1980s.   
I identified the links between these episodes of currency crises and banking crises 
in another paper with Graciela Kaminsky.9   In particular, problems in the banking sector 
typically precede a currency crisis, creating a vicious spiral in which the currency strains 
then deepen the banking problems.  The anatomy of these episodes suggests that crises 
occur as the economy enters a recession, following a prolonged boom in economic 
activity that was fueled by credit, capital inflows and accompanied by an overvalued 
currency.  
The Policy Response 
Given this experience of wide swings in foreign funding, it is not surprising that 
policy makers in many emerging market economies have come to fear capital flows.  
This has been reflected in their behavior, which I believe results from four fears that lurk 
beneath the surface. 
1. Fear of appreciation.  Being the darling of investors in global financial 
centers has the decided, albeit often temporary, advantage of having ample 
access to funds at favorable cost. With the capital inflow comes upward 
pressure on the exchange value of the currency, rendering domestic 
manufacturers less competitive in global markets, and especially so 
relative to their close competitors who are not so favored as an investment 
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vehicle. A desire to stem such an appreciation (which Calvo and Reinhart, 
2002, refer to as “fear of floating”) is typically manifest in the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Over time, though, sterilizing 
such reserve accumulation (the topic of Reinhart and Reinhart, 1998) 
becomes more difficult, and more direct intervention more appealing.    
2. Fear of “hot money.”  For policy makers in developing countries, 
becoming the object of foreign investors’ attention is particularly troubling 
if such affection is viewed as fleeting.10 The sudden injection of funds into 
a small market can cause an initial dislocation that is mirrored by the 
strains associated with their sudden withdrawal. Such a distrust of “hot 
money” was behind James Tobin’s initial proposal to throw sand in the 
wheels of international finance, an idea that has been well received in at 
least some quarters. Simply put, a high-enough tax (if effectively 
enforced) would dissuade the initial inflow and pre-empt the pain 
associated with the inevitable outflow. 
3. Fear of large inflows.  Policy makers in emerging market economies do 
not universally distrust the providers of foreign capital. Not all money is 
hot but even then, sometimes the sheer volume of flows matters. A large 
volume of capital inflows, particularly when it is sometimes indiscriminate 
in the search for higher yields (in the manner documented by Calvo, 
Leiderman and Reinhart, 1994), causes dislocations in the financial 
system. Foreing funds can fuel asset price bubbles and encourage excess 
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risk taking by cash-rich domestic intermediaries. Again recourse to tax 
may seem to yield a large benefit. 
4. Fear of loss of monetary autonomy.  The interests of global investors and 
domestic policy makers need not always—or even often—align. But a 
trinity is always at work that it is not possible to have a fixed (or highly 
managed) exchange rate, monetary policy autonomy, and open capital 
markets (as discussed in Frankel, 2001). If there is some attraction to 
retaining some element of monetary policy flexibility, something has to 
give up. However, in the presence of the aforementioned fear of floating, 
giving up capital mobility may seem more attractive than surrendering 
monetary policy autonomy. 
In light of these fears, the policy of first recourse across countries and over time 
has been sterilized intervention.11  To avoid some (or all) of the nominal exchange rate 
appreciation that would have resulted from the capital inflow, monetary authorities have 
tended to intervene in the foreign exchange market and accumulate foreign exchange 
reserves.  To offset some or all of the associated monetary expansion, central banks have 
most often opted to sell Treasury bills or central bank paper.  Central banks also have 
tools to neutralize the effects on the money stock of their foreign exchange operations 
beyond offsetting domestic open market transactions. Importantly, the effect of the sale 
(purchase) of domestic currency can be offset by raising (lowering) reserve requirements 
to keep the money stock constant.12  However, as long as domestic reserves do not pay a 
competitive interest rate, reserve requirements are a tax on the banking system. Changes 
in the tax can have real effects, including on the exchange value of the currency.  
 10
Moreover, depending on the incidence of the reserve tax, domestic spending and 
production may change as well.   
Fiscal austerity measures, particularly on the spending side, have been used to 
alleviate some of the pressures on the real exchange rate and to cool down overheating in 
the economy.  Furthermore, fiscal surpluses deposited at the central bank have helped 
"sterilize" the expansive monetary effects of foreign exchange purchases. 
Trade liberalization has been accelerated in some cases, in the hope that 
productivity gains in the nontraded sector could dampen pressures on the real exchange 
rate. Moreover, reducing distortions associated with controls on trade may temporarily 
widen the current account deficit--effectively absorbing some of the inflows without 
boosting domestic demand.   
Revaluation of the nominal exchange rate has also been restored to, particularly as 
inflows became persistent and curtailing the monetary expansion associated with the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves became increasingly difficult and costly. In 
some cases, the authorities reached the conclusion that, if an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate was inevitable, it was better that it occur through a change in the nominal 
exchange rate than through a pick-up in domestic inflation.  
Liberalization of capital outflows has also been a popular response to rising 
capital inflows. By permitting domestic residents to hold foreign assets, the conventional 
wisdom holds, gross outflows would increase--thereby reducing net. 
Various forms of controls on capital inflows—whether in the form of taxes, 
quantitative restrictions, or in the guise of “prudential measures”—have been imposed on 
the financial sector, usually with the aim of deterring short-term inflows.13  (Sometimes 
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these controls take the form of prudential measures to curb the exposure of the domestic 
banking sector to the vagaries of real estate prices and equity markets.)  A main finding 
of my paper with Todd Smith, however, is that the tax rate on capital inflows must be 
very high in order to have much effect on the capital account balance.14  For instance, a 
reduction in the capital account balance by five percent of GDP would require a tax rate 
on net interest payments on foreign-held debt on the order of 85 percent for one year or 
60 percent for two years.  
Often, policy makers have resorted to some combination of these policies.  A 
repeated lesson is that the law of unintended consequences has not been repealed.  
Multiple policy responses to capital inflows have tended to interact in ways that were 
probably not anticipated by the framers of such policies.   Most likely, even the best 
policy mix cannot avoid altogether the eventual reversal of capital flows given that they 
are so sensitive to the behavior of investors in financial centers.  The appropriate policy 
mix may dampen the amplitude of the swings in capital flows, thus ensuring a softer 
landing when international investors retrench.  The strongest policy lesson is that 
conservative fiscal policy and zealous supervision of the domestic financial sector are 
essential at all times, especially so when expectations are buoyant. 
This, of course, might be viewed as hard work for policy makers, particularly 
ones who focus exclusively on near-term results.  That may be why some of them more 
readily resort to capital controls to dampen swings in capital flows.  It would be an 
understatement to say that international economists do not speak with one voice as to the 
efficacy of capital controls.  To my mind, part of the problem is that the literature on 
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capital controls co-mingles (at least) four very serious issues that make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to compare across theoretical and empirical studies.  
1. There is no unified theoretical framework (say, as in the currency crisis 
literature) to analyze the macroeconomic consequences of controls; 
2. There is significant heterogeneity across countries and time in the capital 
control measures implemented;  
3. There are multiple definitions of what constitutes a “success” (capital 
controls are a single policy instrument—but there are many policy 
objectives); and  
4.  The empirical studies lack a common methodology and are furthermore 
significantly “overweighted” by two poster children--Chile and Malaysia. 
In joint work with Nicholas Magud, I attempted to address some of these 
shortcomings by being very explicit about what measures are construed as capital 
controls (Magud and Reinhart, 2006).  Also, given that success is measured so differently 
across studies, we sought to “standardize” the results of over 30 empirical studies by 
constructing indices of capital controls.   Inasmuch as possible, we brought to bear the 
experiences of less well known episodes than those of Chile and Malaysia. 
To sum up our long paper, capital controls on inflows seem to: make monetary 
policy more independent; alter the composition of capital flows; reduce real exchange 
rate pressures (although the evidence on this latter point is more controversial).   Capital 
controls on inflows, however, seem not to reduce the volume of net flows (and hence, the 
current account balance)  
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As to controls on capital outflows, there is Malaysia… and there is everybody 
else.  In Malaysia, controls reduce outflows, and may give room for more independent 
monetary policy.   There is little evidence of “success” in other countries attempting to 
control outflows, either in terms of altering the volume or regaining monetary policy 
independence.  These findings are in line with those of an earlier literature focused on 
capital flight (as in Mathieson and Rojas Suarez, 1996) and dual or parallel exchange 
markets (an in Kuigel and Lizondo, 1997).  While their effectiveness varies across time, 
countries, and types of measures used, limiting private external borrowing in the “good 
times” plays an important prudential role because more often than not countries that are 
“debt intolerant”. Indeed, often the critical problem in good times is that countries borrow 
too much!   
While our study made the case for the need to distinguish between measures 
primarily designed to discourage inflows versus curbing outflows, it would be 
worthwhile for future research to attempt to ascertain whether there are also important 
differences in achieving “success” between measures that are more market friendly (as in 
the Chilean reserve requirements) versus those that are based on more blunt quantitative 
restrictions.  Furthermore, it would be interesting for policy purposes to examine 
differences between short run and long run impacts of the measures, so as to ascertain 
how quickly do control measures lose their effectiveness. As long as capital flows to 
emerging markets remain volatile and potentially disruptive, the discussion of capital 
controls in academic and policy circles will remain alive and hence there is a real need, to 
evaluate their effectiveness, however defined.  
Concluding Comments:  What’s Next 
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My own view as to what’s next might best be summed up in the title of a book 
that Ken Rogoff and I are presently working on:  This Time It’s Different.   We have 
learned from our initial discussion with the editors that it is difficult to convey irony with 
a simple title—so much so that we may have to add a more explicit subtitle such as:  A 
Short History of Financial Folly.  History teaches that any understanding of the effects of 
financial globalization must include an appreciation of the almost-willful disregard of 
precedent by global investors at times.  Such disregard makes it difficult to use market 
acceptance as a gauge of meaningful progress in improving economic fundamentals in 
borrowing nations.   And without improved fundamentals, an economy’s ability to cope 
with its debt burdens is ultimately compromised—it becomes debt intolerant.  
True, some emerging-market economies have graduated in the past few decades, 
as most of the Old World did before them.  But all too often, indiscriminate market 
acceptance abroad and reliance on impediments to the effects of capital flows at home 
hide the differences between those policymakers who have made progress and those who 
put off such hard work to their successors.   No doubt, more ready flows of capital across 
national borders can benefit both lenders and borrowers, but in the world we have lived 
in, there have been bumps along the road to enjoying those gains. 
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Table 2:  Frequency of Crises over Time 
 
Figure 2:  Number of Crises per Year 
Source:  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
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Source:  Calvo and Reinhart (2000). 
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